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I
At a time when Britain's increasing involvement with "Europe"
is causing many to fear that the English legal system is being "contaminated" or "eroded" by Continental influences, Continental
criminal procedure continues to amuse, when it does not alarm, the
tourist and the television viewer. Even the increase in violent crime
(including international crime), which provokes repeated calls for
improved methods of detection, apprehension, and obtaining conviction, fails to induce in the British, or in their overseas daughter
nations, any want of faith in their inherited system, under which
the guilty frequently escape punishment but the innocent rarely
suffer. Moreover, the English have done nothing deliberate to impose their own methods upon the Scots, or the Channel Islanders.
Secure in the thought that their own traditions will endure, whatever the cost in efficiency, they have no wish to disturb the traditions of others.' Their celebrated insularity may help to explain why
the British have scarcely bothered to investigate the history of their
prosecutorial methods in a comparative perspective.
An American scholar has recently taken a long, hard look at the
early phases of the English method of prosecuting serious crime
and has questioned a theory that attributed two statutes of Philip
and Mary to Continental influence. 2 The first of these statutes 3 severely restricted the right of a justice of the peace (JP) to grant bail
to an individual accused of a felony. The second statute 4 covered
cases in which the accused felon did not qualify for bail and in which
the JPs committed him to custody to await the next gaol delivery.
The statute required the JPs to make an inquiry into the circumstances of the crime; to bind over witnesses to appear for the Crown
at the trial; and to pass the documentation of these acts to the court
t Professor of Oriental Laws, University of London.
1. In the realm of family law, on the other hand, it is certain that England has learned
something from her daughter nations, and she has learned something from Scandinavia
about machinery for redress of public grievances.
2. See 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 131-34 (2d ed. 1903).
3. 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 (1554-1555).
4. 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10 (1555).
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duly assembled for the gaol delivery. The most notable English
legal historian explained these novelties with the theory that the
government of Mary (who had a Spanish husband and coruler)
must have been aware of recent statutory developments in France
and the Holy Roman Empire and taken some light from those
5
quarters.
Professor John H. Langbein decided to inquire into this rather
casual attribution, sensing that it did not accord with England's
general record. His study 6 is a masterly treatment of the subject. It
is important not only for what it shows, with deep learning and with
a careful, steady, and readable presentation, but also for what it
does not say. With scholarly restraint, the author conveys overtones
the more powerfully for his not allowing them to dominate anywhere. His findings, which strike even a skeptical reader as conclusive, are reminiscent of the results that emerged from the controversy over whether the Statute of Distribution7 was based on the
civil (Continental) law of reserved shares, 8 or was rather the development of a native custom, such as York's, 9 at the expense of the
common law of descent. In both cases, indigenous developments
were ultimately recognized as the most influential.
The book should be especially impressive to those who, like the
present writer, tend to be interested in broad social alternatives and
the slow upward climb of man, but are less conversant with the intricacies of Tudor legislation and Continental legal history. Many
readers with these tastes might have hoped for research like Langbein's, but would have been hard put to find a candidate for it. It
required a combination of vision, optimism, pertinacity, linguistic
flexibility, and, most of all, sufficient distance from the two competing methods of criminal trial, namely, folk conviction and official persecution. Distance without disinvolvement was neededsympathy with the "folk" (in particular, the amateur fact-finders),
yet suspicion of their irregularities; awareness of a cultural debt to
England, without contempt for the Continental alternatives, however repugnantly phrased; readiness to take up, for instance,
5.

4 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at 528-29 (1924).

6. J.

LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE: England, Germany, France
(1974) [hereinafter cited as J. LAN GBEIN].
7. 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 10 (1670).
8. See T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 300 (5th ed. 1956) (discussing the opinion of Sir Joseph Jekyll, M.R.), citing Winder, Sir Joseph Jekyll, Master of the
Rolls, 57 L.Q. REv. 512, 535 (1941). In fact, the scheme took account of current ecclesiastical
practice and was quite distinct from any scheme based on a legitima portio.
9. On York customs, see A BRIEF TREATISE OF TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLES pt. 3, § 16
(2d ed. 1611).
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Tudor paleography, without the normally accompanying elitistspecialist complex that would reject Frfihneuhochdeutsch, the
contemporary German language. No pains that could be taken
were avoided by Langbein; no specialist in the field whose direct
knowledge of the highly disparate materials could be exploited
was left unapproached; and where two surviving copies of a single edition of a comtemporary book could be compared (whether
in Cambridge, England, or Cambridge, Massachusetts), no opportunity to do so was passed up.
The result, a revision of a Cambridge Ph.D. thesis written under
the supervision of Peter Stein, has none of the derivative and slightly
naive air that too many American thesis writers manifest before
their claim to scholarly distinction is achieved. Langbein avoided
that trap by severely disciplining detail to the basic argument, testing that argument in every possible way, and presenting the relevant
material in a mode at once exhaustive and precise. The reader
never loses track of the thesis, and yet, at any point where oversimplification could be suspected, the evidence to sustain the con0
clusion is adduced.'
II
Although it may be unfair to summarize so condensed a book,
one could state Langbein's findings in this way: the Marian statutes
were intended to prevent the escape and secure the conviction of
serious offenders. As an unintended by-product, the function of
JPs in pretrial procedure expanded to the point where the JPs
became prosecuting officials; correspondingly, the role of the
grand jury declined, and the petty jury became more passive. Documentation of testimony was preserved, and the system of binding over witnesses enabled the assize judges to manage prosecutions more efficiently, thus placing a greater responsibility (and
therefore power) in the hands of the JPs.
Meanwhile, both the German code of 1532, the "Carolina", and
the French statute of 1539, the "Ordinance of Villers-Cotterets,"
attempted to direct and develop Inquisitionsprozess, in which the judiciary (overshadowing the civil complainant, if any) directly or indirectly rianaged inquiries into alleged crimes and provided a
10. The success of this research can perhaps be attributed as much to the economical
scope of the contentions as to the wealth of effort put into making them. The Marian statutes
were casually attributed to Continental influence because Holdsworth did not bother to
check a guess. "Brilliance," that ambivalent quality of astute scholarship, has its dud sparks;
it would hardly have been worthwhile for anyone to pursue this attribution if there had not
been a greater issue at stake.
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dossier that led, in different ways, to eventual conviction and sentence.1 1 When analyzed carefully, however, neither statute shows
the remotest similarity to the English scheme. Mary's government
and rejected them as inwould have found them useless as 1models
2
appropriate to England's situation.
In Germany, the popular court had become a feeble vestige; in
France, it had long since disappeared. But Blackstone termed the
jury "the principal criterion of truth in the law of England."1 3 Thus,
as Langbein proves, statutory arrangments facilitating the collection and presentation of evidence to the jury, far from producing
an Inquisitionsprozess,confirmed the reverse. His apt quotations from
Sir Thomas Smith (1565) point up the contrasts between Continental and English procedure (in the latter, practically nothing was put
in writing).' 4 Mary's statutes emphasized, rather than diminished,
the distinctiveness of the native methods.
Fortunate in the rich printed material bearing upon his subject,
Langbein supports his contentions with a survey of statutes and
records lying in the background, as it were, of his scene. Statutes
were not necessarily obeyed. They were intended to be little more
than blueprints, assertions of government policy; when events required their precise implementation, they figured prominently, but
they did not necessarily do so earlier. The author has searched out
archival sources showing that before 1554 JPs had already begun the
practices that the Marian statutes codified. Thus, the statutes were
not revolutionary in principle-or else their innovative effects were,
as usual in England, unforeseen.
The exact relation between the statutes and actual practice is
shown here in sufficient clarity by virtue of a broad research of
satisfying dimensions. Modern scholars are sometimes chary of
dwelling on archaic features; Langbein's deft touches avoid the
Scylla of patronizing the reader and the Charybdis of overhasty
allusion.

11. Neither of these statutes worked a total departure from prior practices. Thus it
would have been particularly surprising if their enactment had resulted in an introduction
of their ideas into English procedure.
12.
13.

J. LANGBEIN 204.
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *348. The English jury, which was a curiosity to

contemporary foreigners, has been attributed by some to French custom, in keeping with
theories that the customs of Normandy are a clue to post-1066 English law (although the
jury was supposed to have been a custom of Paris). In reality, however, the jury system organized by the English kings was a Germanic institution, which, by virtue of geography (see text
at notes 15-16 infra), survived into our own times virtually untouched.
14.

J. LANGBEIN 29-31.
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Langbein could have bolstered his thesis by drawing attention to
Britain's geographical isolation, which enabled the English grand
jury and petty jury to retain their active roles for so long, with the
latter remaining triers of fact to this day. Even the eventual confining of the petty jury to the testimony put before it15 did not substitute an official's judgment for the people's, and it was a long time
before jurors came to be chosen from outside the hundred, and the
maxim vicini vicinorum facta praesumunturscire (neighbors are presumed to kirow the facts) ceased to have effect.' 6 The English jury's
role stands in contrast to the Continental situation, in which the
identity and homogeneity of the folk-and therefore the utility of
"people's courts"--were bound to break down as social organization
became more complex.
The community court; the assessment of ad hoc punishments
without regard for consistent principle; the perpetual adjustment
to the needs of the time and place; the refusal to surrender a neighbor unless he deserved to die; the integration of prestigious amateurs into the peacekeeping role at all levels, without depriving the
community at large of its final say; the introduction of sophisticated
theories of proof and conceptions of law (called "maxims of law" in
Tudor times) that were to be applied by ordinary, unskilled people,
who could barely understand them-this peculiar balance was exported to all the daughter nations and survives there unimpaired.
The continued uniqueness of the jury system is further evidence
that the Continent was scarcely able to affect British prosecutorial
methods.
III
In the course of his discussion, Langbein develops sidelights that
illuminate what would otherwise be a difficult story for us to visualize. Torture, for example, was widely used in Germany and France,
because official inquisition had available none of the means of detection that we now take for granted, and the demise of jury presentation, "folk" knowledge, left no practical alternative. The
Carolina sought to contain, but also to make more efficient, this
archaic system. The English, however, had not abandoned the folk
ascertainment of guilt-neither in the church (with the churchwardens' presentments) nor in secular life-and thus the introduc15. For instances from the period 1557-1601, see J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 89 n.3 (1971).
16. C. SAINT GERMAN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT 24 n.t (17th ed. 1787).
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tion of torture there would have been irrelevant or embarrassing.
The only exceptions were political and quasi-political contexts and
(until the end of Mary's reign) the surviving Romano-canonical
proceedings in which torture in England had originated.
If we are to understand the connections between torture and superstitious concepts about confession, we must not forget the influence of the Judaeo-Christian insistence upon confession as a mercy
to the condemned man, whose survival in this life was much less
important than his share in the World to Come.17 The book says
enough to hint at this background, by comparing, at the grass roots
level, the two extreme methods of ascertaining guilt.' 8
Langbein also considers the extremely important and relevant
question of technical proof. With an air of near incredulity, Langbein reports that if the prosecution's witnesses produced plausible
and congruent testimony, and if'the accused could not prove an
alibi, the incompetence of the witnesses, or the invalidity of the
law under which he was accused, then no amount of testimony in
his favor could exculpate him, deflect judgment, or postpone execution.' 9 The same phenomenon can be observed up to modern
times in Islamic and Hindu law and was, most significantly, found
in Jewish law in the time of Christ and indefinitely thereafter. It
is a simple confirmation of these roots to point to the book of
Mark: if the false witnesses against Christ had agreed among
themselves, the remainder of the trial would have been superfluous. 20 The impact of "learning", the scholarly mind, upon an il-

literate peasant population seems nowhere more pathetic; and in
the period of Queen Mary, the Continental bureaucracies must
have pitied the English for their naivet6, a naivet6 that would
allow such an outstanding patriot as Sir Thomas More to be condemned to death in 1535 on the possibly perjured testimony of
one man.
Langbein could have dilated upon the responsibilities of the JPs,
and in particular their growing duties in the protection of the state
religion, 2' which at the time was in a delicate and precarious position. While hesitating to depart from the principle of folk courts,
17. See James 5:16; 1John 1:9.
18. Langbein neither overemphasizes nor underplays the ecclesiastical sources of the
Inquisitionsprozess.
19. J. LANGBEIN 238.
20. Mark 14:56, 59.
21.

See 23 Eliz. 1, c. 1, § 4 (1581), reprinted in G. ELTON, THE TUDOR CONSTITUTION 422

(1960); 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c. 1, § 5 (1552), reprinted in G. ELTON, supra at 396; 31 Hen. 8, c. 14, § 8
(1539), reprinted in G. ELTON, supra at 389; R. MARCHANT, THE CHURCH UNDER THE LAW
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the state apparently sought to turn its amateur peacekeepers into
agents of central policy. Their religious functions, especially their
activities concerning witchcraft, 22 are known to have supported the
church courts, 23 which characteristically were passing through a
severe phase of inhibition of jurisdiction. Langbein does not enter
into this aspect of the balance of adjudicative power. He appositely
notices that admiralty procedure (for dealing with piracy) was reformed to -accommodate it to common law methods. 24 But it is
equally significant that, while church courts kept their own creaking procedure for suppressing heresy and otherwise attempting
to control the moral life of the nation, the functions of the jury as
triers of fact did not diminish relative to the role of the clergy. Indeed, the more writs of prohibition the ecclesiastical courts issued,
the more likely were the "folk" to control the physical supports
of the religion at the grass roots level.25
The study likewise touches upon ordeals. The 'Judgment of
God, 2 6 which the law teacher of today would pass over with an indulgent or embarrassed smile, has been an international and pervasive notion. Langbein, like others, tends to assume that incompetence and corruption allowed such methods of deciding criminal
cases (and even civil cases) to survive as long as they did. But a study
of the use of ordeals in some Asian jurisdictions confirms that even
today they have a legitimate function in a concrete, homogeneous
society. There the justice of a situation is, not at all naively, understood to be too deep for human judgment. Behind all disputes lie
factors too numerous and too ambivalent for even the most subtle
mind to summarize. Our determined selection of "relevant" factors
by intellectual principles of evidence and procedure produces, as
often as not, injustices as grave as any that could result from tossing
a coin.27 The ordeal (while testing God's judgment, and thus ab-

223-25, 235 (1969);

R. MARCHANT,

THE PURITANS AND

THE

CHURCH COURTS

IN

THE

DIOCESE OF YORK 1560-1642, at 154, 172-73, 181 (1960).
22.

See generally A. MACFARLANE, WITCHCRAFT IN TUDOR AND STUART ENGLAND (1970).

23. In fact, clerics were often JPs.
24. J. LANGBEIN 55.
25.

Cf. W. FULBECKE, Introduction to THE SECOND PART OF THE PARALLELE OR CONFERENCE

OF THE CIVILL LAW, THE CANON LAW, AND THE COMMON LAW OF THIS REALME OF ENGLAND

sig. Br (1602).
26.

See generally 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at 142-43; F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND,

THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1898) (items listed in index under "ordeals"); J. LANGBEIN 134 nn.19-20 (the author cites to more recent authorities). For a fuller treatment, see
Y. BONGERT, RECHERCHES SUR LES COURS LAIQUES DU XeAU XIIIesIjiCLE 211-51 (1949).

27.
-dice

Rabelais's old joke about dice as part of the equipment of a court was double-edged
were needed. 25 BIBLIOTHLQUE D'HUMANISME ET RENAISSANCE 117 (1963).
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horrent to clerics of a certain sophistication) tests primarily sincerity.
And in a tightly-knit society, a sincere persistence in error entitles
an accused to be trusted and thus (at a minimum) to be permitted
to survive. Such a society takes knock for knock, and a sincere but
mistaken belief is of more value in adjudication than the crafty pursuit of an argument based upon an accurate, but too logical, selection of materials!
IV
We come, finally, to the two other principal achievements of the
book: 28 first, Langbein clarifies in the necessary detail the character
and causes of the two contrasting methods of prosecuting crime;
second, he projects the JPs for what they were in their most
vigorous and fruitful period, thus placing a valuable figure of English life in a new, comparative perspective.
Custom once dictated not only what acts were crimes, but also
how they should be detected and punished. Constant fluctuation in
the definitions of offenses, the criteria of guilt, and the balance between deterrent and protective functions in the little society was
necessary and harmless, although subject to the stabilizing influence
of religion (by way of penitentials and so forth). Human wastage of
lives was tolerated, for human existence was in any case short and
insecure.
But when ministates merged through the forces of progress, discrepancies became glaring and inefficiencies intolerable (as professional criminals moved from one jurisdiction to another). Since religious sanctions had become strained and unable to keep order,
society, through its kings, had to define which standards were
merely moral-religious and which were legal. Literatures, especially religious literatures, sometimes turned into ad hoc sources of
law (as Langbein's hero, Lambarde, revealed in his charges to ju28. The minor blemishes in Langbein's highly technical presentation serve only to highlight the expertise evidenced throughout the book. Contrary to J. LANGBEIN 123, there is no
reference to a "concession" in M. DALTON, COUNTRY JUsTICE 261 (1618). DALTON, supra
at 266 (J. LANGBEIN 43) seems to contain an error--"bleede" strikes one as a mistake for
"flee." Also, it would have been altogether desirable to expand on Dalton's curious 'f.
Cor. 24." The citation is to A. FITZHERBERT, CORONE ET PLEZ DEL CORONE folio cclviii', no. 24
(Grand Abr. 1516): "silence in treason: to be hanged."
Langbein describes the fashionable and effective Sir Thomas Smith as "self-taught in
Roman law." J. LANGBEIN 96 n.88. In 18 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 532 (19371939) he is shown as a D.C.L. of Padua. But, as Langbein has noticed from M. DEWAR, SIR
THOMAS SMITH 22 n.2 (1964), no trace of such a doctorate can be found at Padua, and we
have only presumptive proof of it in his "incorporation" as a doctor at Cambridge (one
incorporates a doctor of another university). Possibly the Padua degree was an honorary
one!
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ries). The spiritual authorities and the laity did not cease to cooperate, but they acquired strength independently. Officials were
appointed to administer noncustomary, "peace" law, sometimes
alongside the customary courts 29 and sometimes manipulating
those courts. The king's duty to give justice was needed, not merely to help with definition of the jurisdictions and clarifications of
rights, but also to perform for the minisocieties what they could
no longer perform for themselves.
In England, the main need was not to provide expert investigators and interrogators with inquisitorial powers, but to ensure that
accused persons would be effectively brought to trial before the
people, not trained intellectuals. The "people" (except in Parliament) were no longer in charge of defining crime-that was left to
experts-but this fact was unimportant, because they were ultimately in charge of the issue of guilt. Whether a popular court
should be an ultimate source of law, and the extend to which its
functions can really be assumed by experts and delegated tribunals,
are still open questions; the growth of nations leaves the ultimate
division of functions uncertain, and it cannot be assumed that the
Anglo-Saxon method most nearly approaches the ideal. But as the
world shrinks, the confrontations among methods and experiences
become more marked.
Meanwhile, English literature has found plenty of room for the
JP. He was (or could be) a pompous and self-important busybody.
In the Tudor period, he could be impudent even to a diocesan
bishop until the latter threatened him with his powerful friends' resentment. 30 He was taken so much for granted as an integral part
of the dual machinery of government that learning and fun march
easily together in the incomparable opening to The Merry Wives of
3
Windsor: 1
Justice Shallow: Sir Hugh, persuade me not: I will make a Starchamber matter of it; if he were twenty Sir John Falstaffs he
shall not abuse Robert Shallow, esquire.
Slender: In the county of Gloucester, justice of peace, and coram.
Shal. Ay, cousin Slender, and custalorum.
For "assignanimus"(J. LANGBEIN 117), read "assignavimus." And "salt in the wound" (id. at
206) is a common misconception-salt is a healer.
29. Here I call attention to the parable of the unjust judge. Luke 18:1-8; see Derrett, Law
in the New Testament: The Parableof the UnjustJudge, 18 NEw TEST. STUD. 178 (,972).
30. See Letter from Bishop Latimer to "a certain Gentleman," July 15, 1555 in 7 J. FoxE,
THE ACTS & MONUMENTS 512 (1563).
31. W. SHAKESPEARE, THE MERRY WIVES OF WINDSOR, act I, scene 1, lines 1-11 (1601)
(van Santvoord ed. 1922).

1974]

Review

Slen. Ay, and ratolorum[32] too; and a gentleman born, Master
Parson; who writes himself armigero, in any bill, warrant, quittance, or obligation,-armigero.
Langbein enables us to see 33 that JPs did indeed report matters like
a riot to the Star Chamber, as Merry Wives goes on to suggest. 3 4 The
JPs' powers of investigation and coercion were limited in practice as
well as in their commission, and the long-drawn-out process of
common law prosecution was no universal prophylactic. Men also
went to the Star Chamber to bypass the normal process and prosecute feuds with notables. 35
Shallow's comical confusion of coram with quorum 36 fitted the times
well enough: the number of justices commissioned to be part of a
quorum had undergone an absurd inflation, so that the class included a high proportion of notables without the legal training that
originally entitled men to membership in the essential learned nucleus of any given bench. The title had become merely ornamental. 37 And yet that much-recited passage about the Ages of Man in
As You Like It 38 assumed the public's faith that the well-to-do elements of society had their share not merely of that Tudor virtue,
gravity, but also of legal learning, which Lambarde, himself a JP,
so wonderfully manifested. It does not appear that the Continental
systems for all their corps of officials and their exaggerated faith
in university law faculties, could have presented an attractive alternative.
32. The term that these characters are fumbling for is custos rotulorum, i.e., the leading
justice of the county as keeper of local judicial records. On this topic, see G. ELTON, supra
note 21, at 453, 458-59 (quoting Lambarde).
33. J. LANGBEIN 79-80. See also 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at 135.
34. W. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 31, act I, scene 1, line 35.
35. R. MARCHANT, THE CHURCH UNDER THE LAW 177-78 (1969).
36. "Quorum was the first word of a clause in the commission which named justices, and
so came to be a title of certain justices. Coram was the first word Shallow would use as justice,
in attestation of the legal documents he speaks of in lines 10 and 11: 'Coram me Roberto
Shallow, armigero,' i.e., 'before me Robert Shallow, Esquire.'" W. SHAKESPEARE, supra note
31, at 109 (editor's note to the passage quoted in text).
37. J. LANGBEIN 112-16.
38. W. SHAKESPEARE, As You LIKE IT, act II, scene 7, lines 153-56 (1599): "And then the
justiceI In fair round belly with good capon lin'dj With eyes severe and beard of formal
cut, Full of wise saws and modern instances; ......

